# RANCHER $ ^{®} $ # Rancher Kubernetes Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Document Version 1.1 January 4, 2021 Prepared for: ![Image](/uploads/documents/b/8/7/3/b8 Corsec Security, Inc. 13921 Park Center Rd., Ste. 460 Herndon, VA 20171 corsec.com +1 703.276.6050 ## References |Ref|Full Specification Name|Date| |---|---|---| |\[140]|FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements Requirements for Cryptographic Modules|12/3/2002| |\[140AA]|FIPS 140-2 Annex A: Approved Security Functions|6/10/2019| |\[140AC]|FIPS 140-2 Annex C: Approved Random Number Generators|6/10/2019| |\[140AD]|FIPS

## Pod 容忍节点异常时间调整 ### 1. 原理说明 Kubernetes 集群节点处于异常状态之后需要有一个等待时间，才会对节点上的 Pod 进行驱逐。那么针对部分关键业务，是否可以调整这个时间，便于在节点发生异常时及时将 Pod 驱逐并在别的健康节点上重建？ 要解决这个问题，我们首先要了解 Kubernetes 在节点异常时驱逐 Pod 的机制。 在 Kubernetes 1.13 这两个 feature gate，节点及其上 Pod 的生命周期管理将通过节点的 Condition 和 Taint 来进行，Kubernetes 会不断地检查所有节点状态，设置对应的 Condition，根据 Condition 为节点设置对应的 Taint，再根据 Taint 来驱逐节点上的 Pod。 同时在创建 Pod 时会默认为 Pod 添加相应的 tolerationSeconds 参数，指定当节点出现异常（如 参数，指定当节点出现异常（如 NotReady）时 Pod 还将在这个节点上运行多长的时间。 那么，节点发生异常到 Pod 被驱逐的时间，就取决于两个参数：1. 节点实际异常到被判断为不健康的时间；2. Pod 对节点不健康的容忍时间。 Kubernetes 集群中默认节点实际异常到被判断为不健康的时间为 40s, Pod 对节点 NotReady 的容忍时间为 5min, 也就是说, 节点实际异常

configurations and controls required to address Kubernetes benchmark controls from the Center for Information Security (CIS). This hardening guide describes how to secure the nodes in your cluster, and it is recommended configurations required to address Kubernetes benchmark controls from the Center for Information Security (CIS). For more detail about evaluating a hardened cluster against the official CIS benchmark, specific service account is assigned to the pod. Where access to the Kubernetes API from a pod is required, a specific service account should be created for that pod, and rights granted to that service account

configurations and controls required to address Kubernetes benchmark controls from the Center for Information Security (CIS). This hardening guide describes how to secure the nodes in your cluster, and it is recommended configurations required to address Kubernetes benchmark controls from the Center for Information Security (CIS). For more detail about evaluating a hardened cluster against the official CIS benchmark, a private IP to be provided when registering the custom nodes. • When setting the default_pod_security_policy_template_id: to restricted Rancher creates RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBindings on the default

Kubernetes Benchmark v1.5 - Rancher v2.4 with Kubernetes v1.15.4 Controls 5 1 Master Node Security Configuration 6 1.1 Master Node Configuration Files 6 1.2 API Server 14 1.3 Controller Manager 4 Worker Node Security Configuration 38 4.1 Worker Node Configuration Files 38 4.2 Kubelet 42 5 Kubernetes Policies 49 5.1 RBAC and Service Accounts 49 5.2 Pod Security Policies 50 5.3 download a PDF version of this document ## Overview This document is a companion to the Rancher v2.4 security hardening guide. The hardening guide provides prescriptive guidance for hardening a production installation

[Image](/uploads/documents/7/9/8/4/798486b9f79b00da59cc67d5376f87ea/p1_1.jpg) PRESENTS ## V itess security audit In collaboration with the Vitess maintainers, Open Source Technology Improvement Fund and 2023, Ada Logics carried out a security audit of Vitess. The primary focus of the audit was a new component of Vitess, VTAdmin. The goal was to conduct a holistic security audit which includes multiple multiple disciplines to consider the security posture from different perspectives. To that end, the audit had the following high-level goals: 1. Formalise a threat model of VTA_{admin}. 2. Manually audit the

## I stio Security Assessment ## Google August 6, 2020 – Version 1.1 Prepared for Arun Kumar R Prepared by Mark Manning Jeff Dileo Divya Natesan Andy Olsen ## Synopsis In the summer of 2020, assessment was to identify security issues related to the Istio code base, highlight high risk configurations commonly used by administrators, and provide perspective on whether security features sufficiently car injector, and other Istio control plane services - Istio Documentation: The documentation and security guides hosted on istio.io. NCC Group started the assessment with an overall architecture review

## A Security Guide for Kotlin Developers  Overview.....1 Kotlin's Security Profile.....2 Most Common Security Attacks Attacks.....3 Top Kotlin Security Risk.....5 OWASP Mobile TOP 10 Mobile Risks.....10 Protect Your Kotlin Programs with Kiuwan.....11 A pragmatic, modern, and statically typed coding language that's developers and other key decision makers in software security and software supply chain vulnerabilities with information regarding the top security risks they can expect to face — from inherent weaknesses

получении запроса на соединение процесс сервера удостоверяет пользователя по базе данных безопасности (security database). После успешного удостоверения сервер разрешает приложению (пользователю) произвести доступ то даже хорошее шифрование становится немного больше, чем "безопасностью по неясности" (security by obscurity). ##### 4.2.2. Ограничение распространения данных Некоторые просят шифровать данные "безопасности по неясности" Предлагаются и различные другие формы "безопасности по неясности" (security by obscurity). Например, специальные события, возникающие в моменты входа/подключения и отключения

[Image](/uploads/documents/5/7/c/4/57c452da15658819e9898bc9e882370f/p1_1.jpg) # Firebird File and Metadata Security Geoff Worboys Version 0.6, 30 June 2020 ## Table of Contents 1. Introduction ..... 2 2. Background 5. Embedded Firebird Server ..... 10 6. Other Forms of Obscurity ..... 11 7. Acceptable Low Security ..... 12 8. Choosing Obscurity ..... 13 9. The Philosophical Argument ..... 14 10. Conclusions page and don’t know about Firebird, see this link: www.firebirdsql.org This article discusses the security of Firebird database files and in particular access to the metadata stored in those files. It has