. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 2.8. Context Request Flow. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . is that any attacker could simply directly call step 3 without any kind of security. Instead the flow should look something like this: 1. Login to a social platform 2. Call back to a special secured profile. Profile ID are UUIDs, which make them (pretty) safe from brute- forcing. 2.8. CONTEXT REQUEST FLOW Here is an overview of how Unomi processes incoming requests to the ContextServlet. Apache Unomi

is that any attacker could simply directly call step 3 without any kind of security. Instead the flow should look something like this: 1. Login to a social platform 2. Call back to a special secured system is multi-layered. For requests coming in through the /cxs/context.json endpoint, the following flow is used to secure incoming requests: thirdparty.provider1.key=secret-key thirdparty.provider1.ipAddresses=127 profile. Profile ID are UUIDs, which make them (pretty) safe from brute- forcing. 13.3. CONTEXT REQUEST FLOW Here is an overview of how Unomi processes incoming requests to the ContextServlet . 13.4. DATA