component is the localstorage binding which is hardened against arbitrary file writes: https://github.com/dapr/components-contrib/blob/cfbac4d794b35e5da28d65a13369d33383fb6ad4/binding s/localstorage/localstorage is trusted. The second example we found was another defense against path traversal in the HTTP binding: https://github.com/dapr/components-contrib/blob/e46130ad74ebd9871cfe0ad7914d3a168a914cc 7/bindings/http/http ADA-DAPR-23-5 Archived and deprecated 3rd-party dependencies Low Yes 6 ADA-DAPR-23-6 Possible DoS in HTTP binding Moderate Yes 7 ADA-DAPR-23-7 OOM triggerable by malicious PubSub message Moderate Yes 6 ADA-DAPR-23-7

MDNS probes to docker network (Info) DAP-01-007 WP2: HTTP Parameter Pollution in Azure SignalR binding (Info) DAP-01-009 WP2: Potential DoS via RetryPolicy of state components (Medium) DAP-01-011 WP2: is recommended to authenticate the request originating from the Dapr API. This could be done by binding the request data to a cryptographic signature containing Dapr- relevant meta-information and similar SignalR binding (Info) It was found that the SignalR output binding of Dapr is vulnerable to a HTTP Parameter Pollution on service invocation. When invoking an operation on the SignalR output binding, the

Applications Retail PoS Application Built with Stateless and Stateful Services Storage Binding State Binding Event Binding Hostname Ingress Scaling Register Actors Actors Inventory Service Checkout

Parameter Pollution in Azure SignalR binding (Info) Status: Open During a review of the previously reported HTTP Parameter Pollution inside the Azure SignalR binding, it was noticed that the code