configuration in scope, it was found that the running pythonapp-dapr, attached to the default namespace, is neither isolated by a default NetworkPolicy2 / SecurityPolicy3, nor filtered by default ingress running the Python and nodejs sample applications in the default namespace, the attacker would be able to move laterally through that namespace. Furthermore, since there is no securityContext4 defined for execution bit to the downloaded kubectl binary and queries the default namespace for secrets. chmod +x ./kubectl ./kubectl get secret --namespace default redis -o jsonpath="{.data.redis- password}" | base64 -d

Application focused Application focused Container infrastructure Open Application Model Service Job Namespace Secret Volume Endpoint ConfigMap VolumeAttach CronJob Deployment ReplicaSet Pod Service

complex applications are manageable Container infrastructure Open Application Model Service Job Namespace Secret Volume Endpoint ConfigMap VolumeAttach CronJob Deployment ReplicaSet Pod Service

BucketName) request := objectstorage.GetObjectRequest{ NamespaceName: &c.objectStorageMetadata.Namespace, BucketName: &c.objectStorageMetadata.BucketName, ObjectName: &objectname, } response, err :=