Istio Security Assessment Google August 6, 2020 – Version 1.1 Prepared for Arun Kumar R Prepared by Mark Manning Jeff Dileo Divya Natesan Andy Olsen Feedback on this project? https://my.nccgroup assessment was to identify security issues related to the Istio code base, highlight high risk configurations commonly used by administrators, and provide perspective on whether security features sufficiently subsequent phases of the assessment. A test plan was created which matched areas of code with specific security controls (e.g. service discovery, certificate lifecycle, side car injection) to focus testing efforts

” From https://dapr.io/#about This report describes the results of a large-scale and thorough security assessment targeting the Microsoft Distributed Application Runtime (Dapr) software complex1 substantial research and acquired a very good coverage over the scope. Cure53 managed to identify twelve security-relevant issues affecting the Dapr complex. Eight problems represent vulnerabilities and four warranting being reported to Dapr while the test was still ongoing. Similarly as in the former case, the fixes were proposed, deployed and then verified. In addition, one issue documented as DAP-01-010 was reported

diversity of languages and developer frameworks.” From https://dapr.io/#about This report continues a security-driven cooperation between Cure53 and Dapr, reporting on the findings of a penetration test and and source code audit against the Dapr software. In addition to shedding light on the state of security on some new features of Dapr, the report also highlights what has been done in terms of fixing the issues follow-up to the project reported as DAP-01, which was a large-scale and comprehensive security examination. Back in June 2020, the budget of twenty days was invested. Comparatively, a smaller

PRESENTS Dapr security audit In collaboration with the Dapr maintainers, Open Source Technology Improvement Fund and The Linux Foundation Authors Adam Korczynski David Korczynski com> Date: 6th September 2023 This report is licensed under Creative Commons 4.0 (CC BY 4.0) Dapr security audit 2023 Table of contents Table of contents 1 Executive summary 2 Project Summary 3 Audit found 17 SLSA 43 Supply-chain mitigations 45 1 Dapr security audit 2023 Executive summary In May and June 2023, Ada Logics carried out a security audit for the Dapr project. The high-level goal was to

Anthony Roman, Lei Tang Google April 26, 2022 Service mesh security best practices: from implementation to verification Who are we? Anthony Roman Istio Github: anthony-roman Lei Tang Istio agenda 1. Service mesh security architecture and implementation. 2. Service mesh security best practices. 3. Lifecycle of service mesh security and demo. Service mesh security architecture ● Attack Attack vectors. ● Service mesh security architecture and implementation. 1 Attack Vectors and Surfaces Istio is both a collection of security controls and an attack target. Workload Cluster Edge Operations

non-proprietary security policy document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification. Rancher Kubernetes Cryptographic Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy CA 94042 rancher.com Corsec Security, Inc. 13921 Park Center Rd., Ste. 460 Herndon, VA 20171 corsec.com +1 703.276.6050 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Rancher Kubernetes Cryptographic Specification Name Date [140] FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules 12/3/2002 [140AA] FIPS 140-2 Annex A: Approved Security Functions 6/10/2019 [140AC] FIPS 140-2 Annex

240 9.34.1 Setting up USB/IP support on a Linux system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240 9.34.2 Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 9.35 VISO file format / 2 VM aborts with out of memory errors on Solaris 10 hosts . . . . . . . . 275 13 Security guide 277 13.1 General Security Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277 13.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 13.3 Security Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 13.3.1 The Security Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

240 9.34.1 Setting up USB/IP support on a Linux system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240 9.34.2 Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 9.35 VISO file format VM aborts with out of memory errors on Solaris 10 hosts . . . . . . . . 275 13 Security guide 277 13.1 General Security Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277 13.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 13.3 Security Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 13.3.1 The Security Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

240 9.34.1 Setting up USB/IP support on a Linux system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240 9.34.2 Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 9.35 VISO file format VM aborts with out of memory errors on Solaris 10 hosts . . . . . . . . 275 13 Security guide 277 13.1 General Security Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277 13.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 13.3 Security Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 13.3.1 The Security Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

240 9.34.1 Setting up USB/IP support on a Linux system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240 9.34.2 Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 9.35 VISO file format VM aborts with out of memory errors on Solaris 10 hosts . . . . . . . . 275 13 Security guide 277 13.1 General Security Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277 13.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 13.3 Security Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 13.3.1 The Security Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .