Operators, 和 Helm-based Operators。 使用 Operator SDK 来构建、测试并部署 Operator。 安装 Operator 并订阅命名空间。 通过 Web 控制台 从已安装的 Operator 创建应用程序。 其他 其他资源 源 Operator 开发人员的机器删除生命周期 hook 示例 1.2. 对于管理员 作为集群管理员，您可以执行以下 Operator 为什么使用 什么使用 Kubernetes API 和 和 kubectl 工具来管理您的 工具来管理您的应用程序？ 用程序？ 这些 API 功能丰富，所有平台均有对应的客户端，并可插入到集群的访问控制/审核中。Operator 会 使用 Kubernetes 的扩展机制“自定义资源定义 (CRD)”支持您的自定义对象，如 MongoDB，它类似于 内置的原生 Kubernetes 对象。 Operator Lifecycle Manager (OLM) 能够控制集群中 Operator 的安装、升级和基于角色的访问控制 OpenShift Container Platform 4.14 Operator 6 Operator Lifecycle Manager (OLM) 能够控制集群中 Operator 的安装、升级和基于角色的访问控制 (RBAC)。它默认部署在 OpenShift Container

生命周期和支持的平台的更多信息，请参阅平 台生命周期政策。 1.1.1. Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 简介 Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 通过在应用程序中创建集中控制点来解决微服务架构中的各种问题。它 在现有分布式应用上添加一个透明层，而无需对应用代码进行任何更改。 微服务架构将企业应用的工作分成模块化服务，从而简化扩展和维护。但是，随着微服务架构上构建的企 恢复、指标和监控的服务网络提供了便捷的方法。服务网格还提供更复杂的操作功能，其中包括 A/B 测 试、canary 发行版本、访问控制以及端到端验证。 1.1.2. 核心功能 Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 在服务网络间提供了实现关键功能的统一方式： 流量管理 - 控制服务间的流量和 API 调用，提高调用的可靠性，并使网络在条件不好的情况保持 稳定。 服务标识和安全性 - 在网格中提供可验证身份的服务，并提供保护服务流量的能力，以便可以通 过信任度不同的网络进行传输。 策略强制 - 对服务间的交互应用机构策略，确保实施访问策略，并在用户间分配资源。通过配置 网格就可以对策略进行更改，而不需要修改应用程序代码。 遥测 - 了解服务间的依赖关系以及服务间的网络数据流，从而可以快速发现问题。 1.2. SERVICE MESH 发行注记 1.2.1. 使开源包含更多

--- apiVersion: v1 kind: Namespace metadata: name: ingress-nginx --- apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 kind: Role metadata: name: default-psp-role namespace: ingress-nginx --- apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 kind: RoleBinding metadata: name: default-psp-rolebinding namespace: ingress-nginx roleRef: apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io name: default-psp-role subjects: - apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io kind: Group name: system:serviceaccounts - apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io kind: Group name: system:authenticated

--- apiVersion: v1 kind: Namespace metadata: name: ingress-nginx --- apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 kind: Role metadata: name: default-psp-role namespace: ingress-nginx --- apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 kind: RoleBinding metadata: name: default-psp-rolebinding namespace: ingress-nginx roleRef: apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io name: default-psp-role subjects: - apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io kind: Group name: system:serviceaccounts - apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io kind: Group name: system:authenticated

Remediation In the RKE cluster.yml file ensure the following options are set: addons: | apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 kind: Role metadata: name: default-psp-role namespace: ingress-nginx --- apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 kind: RoleBinding metadata: name: default-psp-rolebinding namespace: ingress-nginx roleRef: apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io name: default-psp-role subjects: - apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io kind: Group name: system:serviceaccounts - apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io kind: Group name: system:authenticated

--authorization-mode argument includes Node (Automated) 1.2.9 Ensure that the --authorization-mode argument includes RBAC (Automated) 1.2.10 Ensure that the admission control plugin EventRateLimit is set (Automated) 1.2 (Automated) 4.2.13 Ensure that the Kubelet only makes use of Strong Cryptographic Ciphers (Automated) 5.1 RBAC and Service Accounts 5.1.1 Ensure that the cluster-admin role is only used where required (Manual) range=10.43.0.0/16 --tls-cert-file=/etc/kubernetes/ssl/kube- apiserver.pem --authorization-mode=Node,RBAC --audit-log- maxsize=100 --audit-log-format=json --requestheader-allowed- names=kube-apiserver-proxy-client

Once VTAdmin has obtained an actor from the incoming request, VTAdmin validates the actor against the RBAC. As such, the flow of handling the permissions of incoming requests looks as such: Authentication interface: https://github.com/vitessio/vitess/blob/da1906d54eaca4447e039d90b96fb07251ae852c/g o/vt/vtadmin/rbac/authentication.go#L37. Vitess links to an example authentication plugin which is available here: https://gist The logic is implemented here: https://github.com/vitessio/vitess/tree/main/go/vt/vtadmin/rbac. VTAdmin checks RBAC rules in the route handlers with a call to IsAuthorized, for example: https://github.c

Pod and Network Security Policies 4 3 2 2 Configurable Adherence to CIS 4 3 2 2 Global RBAC Policies 4 2 3 2 2.4 Shared Tools and Services Once deployed, Kubernetes Management Platforms After an administrator launches a user cluster, end users can access it according to Kubernetes RBAC boundaries. 3.1.11 Private Registry and Image Management • SUSE Rancher: 3 • OpenShift: 4 the global level, after which users and groups from the provider are available for assignment to RBAC roles and downstream clusters. A Buyer’s Guide to Enterprise Kubernetes Management Platforms Copyright

Pollution in Hashicorp secret vault (Low) Orchestration Hardening Network Policy Zero-Trust Concepts RBAC Secrets Management Conclusions Cure53, Berlin · 07/01/20 1/19 maintainers during the audit. It was mitigated by changing the service token to Dapr-sidecar and adding RBAC for the service-token. DAP-01-003 WP1: HTTP Parameter Pollution through invocation (Low) It was Data ==== token: eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6[...] It is strongly recommended to implement RBAC6 and configure access delegation for assets and resources in the cluster in order to offer what is

for Integrity 009 Medium Go Trace Profiling Enabled By Default 013 Medium Permissive Kubernetes RBAC within a Namespace 015 Medium Default Sidecar Image Not Hardened 001 Low The Sidecar Does Not Use a Kubernetes cluster. This would also enable hostnames to be more easily protected via Kubernetes’ RBAC. Regardless, care should be taken with how canonicalization and prioritiza- tion between Hostnames | Google Istio Security Assessment Google / NCC Group Confidential Finding Permissive Kubernetes RBAC within a Namespace Risk Medium Impact: Medium, Exploitability: Low Identifier NCC-GOIST2005-015